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The Awe-some Argument for Pantheism 
 
Many pantheists have noted that to a significant extent their view of the divine is motivated by a 
kind of spiritual experience (see, e.g., the references in Levine 1994, ch.2). The cosmos just 
seems to be divine to them, we might say. In this paper, I articulate a novel argument that gives 
voice to this kind of motivation for pantheism. The argument is based on the emotion of awe, 
and draws inspiration from recent work on the emotion of admiration conducted by advocates of 
moral exemplarism. The basic idea is that awe functions in the spiritual domain in the way that, 
according to these authors, admiration functions in the moral domain; but, given that it does, 
there is a plausible route to affirming pantheism. The argument is bolstered to a significant extent 
through critical engagement with empirical research on awe. 
 I set out this argument in further detail in Section 1, identifying some considerations in its 
favor and explaining how it might prove attractive to certain audiences. I then show in Section 2 
how this approach to justifying pantheism offers the pantheist distinctive resources for 
responding to three historically influential objections to pantheism. In the concluding section 3, I 
discuss three further questions about the argument that serve to highlight interesting ways in 
which the considerations here adduced in favor of pantheism could lead to more exotic versions 
of pantheism or even to views that resist easy classification as pantheistic or not pantheistic. 
 
1. The Awe-some Argument for Pantheism 
The novel argument for pantheism I will develop is based on two claims about the emotion of 
awe. One claim pertains to the function of awe, while the other pertains to the proper objects of 
awe.  
7KHDUJXPHQW¶VFODLPDERXWWKHIXQFWLRQRIDZHLVEDVHGRQWKHLGHDWKDWDZHIXQFWLRQVLQ
the spiritual domain in the way that admiration does in the moral domain, according to recent 
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advocates of moral exemplarism²Linda Zagzebski (2017), in particular.1 According to 
Zagzebski, the emotion of admiration is a fallible guide to the moral domain. Moral features, 
such as the good life, virtues, or obligatory actions can be defined ostensively via direct 
reference to those for whom admiration survives critical scrutiny. The good life is a life lived by 
an admirable person, virtues are traits of character we admire in admirable people, and obligatory 
acts are acts that an admirable person demands of herself and others. Defining these moral 
features in this way does not reveal the content of the relevant moral concepts, but instead 
facilitates identification of these features in the real world, which can then itself enable empirical 
study of their underlying nature. Admiration leads us to exemplars, and by studying these 
exemplars empirically we can understand what the nature of the good life, virtue, or obligatory 
action is.  
 According to my argument, the emotion of awe functions in similar fashionas a fallible 
guide to the spiritual domain²a domain commonly characterized as transcendent or spiritually 
ultimate or divine. The divine can be defined ostensively as that for which awe survives critical 
scrutiny, and the spiritual life can be defined as that life that exhibits proper responsiveness to 
the divine. As with exemplarism, the awe-EDVHGDSSURDFKWRWKHGLYLQHGRHVQ¶WLQSURYLGLQJWKHVH
definitions seek to identify the content of the relevant concepts, but rather seeks to identify a 
procedure for discovering their nature. According to the awe-based approach to the divine, 
following the emotion of awe can lead us to detect divine things, the underlying nature of which 
we can then seek to understand.  
                                                          
1
 The idea here is not that moral exemplarism must be true in order for what I claim regarding the function of awe to 
be true, or vice versa. Rather, moral exemplarism provides a useful heuristic for approaching what I claim regarding 
the function of awe; and, to the extent that the former has attracted much scholarly attention, we might anticipate 
similar scholarly interest in the latter. 
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 The second claim of the argument regards the proper objects of awe. It affirms that the 
cosmos is the most proper object of awe. The cosmos is that object for which our awe would 
most survive critical scrutiny under idealization. If we were to imagine a perfecting of our 
emotional sensitivity of awe through time comparable to the sort of idealization of science often 
discussed in the philosophy of science literature (e.g., Putnam 1981), the second claim of my 
argument maintains that idealized awe of this sort would hone in on the cosmos as its most 
fitting object.  
 Putting these two claims together, we can state what I will call the Awe-some Argument 
for Pantheism as follows: 
Functional Claim That which most continues to elicit awe under critical scrutiny is 
most divine. 
Objectual Claim The cosmos is that which most continues to elicit awe under 
critical scrutiny. 
Conclusion So, the cosmos is most divine. 
 
I treat this argument as an argument for pantheism, because the conclusion of the argument is an 
affirmation of pantheism as this view is commonly understood. At least, it is an affirmation of 
pantheism as long as in being the most divine the cosmos is also very divine. Notably, the 
conclusion is compatible with the idea (affirmed by some pantheists) that sub-parts of the 
cosmos are also divine, albeit less so than the cosmos itself. Also notable is the fact that the 
conclusion does not rule out the existence of a creator of the cosmos (also an idea affirmed by 
some pantheists), even one of the sort regarded as divine by the Abrahamic faiths²an 
observation to which I will return below, especially in Section 3. In the remainder of this 
Section, I will adduce some considerations in favor of the Functional Claim and the Objectual 
Claim of this argument, and offer some comments regarding the sorts of audiences for whom the 
argument might exercise persuasive force. 
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 First, consider the Functional Claim. At least four lines of evidence can be cited in favor 
of this claim. First, practitioners of very different spiritualities have in fact claimed that awe 
functions in this way. For example, AEUDKDP+HVFKHOD-HZLVKWKHLVWVD\VWKDW³$ZHUDWKHU
than faith is the cardinal attitude of the religious Jew. . . . In Judaism, yirat hashem, the awe of 
God, or yirat shamayim, the awe of heaven, is almost equivalent to the word µUHOLJLRQ¶´ (1955: 
77). Howard Wettstein, a philosopher attracted to a form of naturalist spirituality, proposes that 
³ZKHUHWKHUHLVDZHWKHUHLVKROLQHVV,WLVDVLIDZHZHUHDIDFXOW\IRUGLVFHUQLQJWKHKRO\´ 
(2012: 33-4). On both accounts, awe is the primary emotion that first enables contact between a 
person and God, or that which is most spiritually ultimate. To the extent that these authors and 
other spiritual practitioners who would agree with them are to be trusted as authorities regarding 
the origins of the spiritual life, their affirmations provide some evidence in favor of the 
Functional Claim about awe. 
Second, there is experimental evidence linking experiences of awe and religious 
commitment. Psychological research has revealed that people who experience awe-inducing 
stimuli such as videos of natural beauty report higher levels of spirituality (Saroglou, Buxant, 
and Tilquin 2008) and belief in transcendent realities (Valdesolo and Graham 2014) than people 
who experience stimuli that do not tend to induce awe. This evidence would be explained well if 
part of the function of awe was to put experients in contact with the spiritually ultimate, as per 
the Functional Claim. 
Third, scholars who have been involved in cross-cultural studies of diverse religions have 
found that awe is a persistent marker of the origin of religion. For example, Peterson and 
Seligman, after conducting their research on cross-cultural strengths of transcendence, reported 
the following:  
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The preceding analyses could be taken to show that awe is the proper response to seeing 
DQ\PDQLIHVWDWLRQRI*RG*RG¶VSRZHURU*RG¶VJRRGQHVVUHYHDOHGLQDQ\DVSHFWRI
creation, be it a landscape, a thunderstorm, a cathedral, or a virtuous person. However, 
the reverse causal path is just as plausible: People have an innate tendency to be moved 
by beauty and excellence, and whenever these profound and ineffable feelings are 
triggered, people attribute the cause to the presence of God. This analysis would suggest 
that it is the very existence of the human capacity for appreciation that generates religions 
across human societies. Many of the accoutrements of religion (music, architecture, 
ritual, stories about saints) can then be seen as attempts to amplify these feelings of awe-
filled appreciation. (2004: 542-3) 
Awe is that emotion by virtue of which people the world over feel connected to the divine; if the 
feeling is trustworthy when subjected to critical scrutiny, then the Functional Claim follows. 
 Finally, some support for the Functional Claim can be identified in failures of non-
spiritual accounts of the function of awe. Instructive here is the work of Helen De Cruz and 
Johan De Smedt on the impact that the cognitive science of aesthetics should have on our 
assessment of the natural theological argument from beauty. The latter argument maintains that 
the universal human propensity to experience awe in the face of beautiful stimuli of widely 
different types is best explained via appeal to an aesthetically sensitive deity who can be 
encountered via experiencing beauty. De Cruz and De Smedt (2014) argue that the failure of 
purely naturalistic, non-spiritual accounts of the human propensity for awe lends some support to 
this argument. For example, the purely naturalistic biophilia hypothesis (Wilson 1984), which 
maintains that the function of human awe was to motivate early humans to remain in natural 
environments suitable for their survival, does not adequately explain why natural environments 
so inhospitable for human survival are also among the best represented objects of awe. Likewise, 
.HOWQHU¶VDQG+DLGW¶Vhighly influential proposal that awe was primordially a response to 
displays of social dominance and functioned to maintain social hierarchies is difficult to square 
with the evidence that DZH¶V ³PRVWLPSRUWDQWHOLFLWRU´ (147) is non-social, natural beauty. In the 
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face of the inadequacies of non-spiritual accounts of the function of awe, De Cruz and De Smedt 
ZULWH³7KHUHLVDWSUHVHQWQRVDWLVIDFWRU\naturalistic explanation for why humans value natural 
beauty that does not conform to their evolved tastes. Hence, the proponent of the aesthetic 
argument can hold that God is currently the best explanation for this sense of beauty. . . . our 
tendency to sHHNEHDXW\FDQEHH[SODLQHGDVDTXHVWIRU*RG´ (154). 
 1RZZKHQ'H&UX]DQG'H6PHGWKHUHDSSHDOWR³*RG´WKH\DUHLQWHQGLQJWRDSSHDOWR
a God of the traditional theistic sort²one who is the creator of rather than identical to the 
cosmos. They maintain that the failure of purely naturalistic, non-spiritual accounts of awe lends 
some credence to the idea that part of the function of awe is to put human beings into contact 
with this sort of God. Still, to the extent that their argument is successful, it should also lend 
support to the more general hypothesis invoked here, that the function of awe is to put human 
beings into contact with the divine, where the notion of divinity is not (yet) further specified, 
whether in the direction of traditional theism or another direction. Put differently, awe 
experiences signal the satisfaction of a need; the unavailability of a purely naturalistic, non-
spiritual account of what this need is lends credence to the idea that the need is instead a spiritual 
one²a need for connection to, experience of the divine. If this is true, it provides confirmation 
of the Functional Claim of the Awe-some Argument for Pantheism. 
 Before moving on to the Objectual Claim, we might pause to note the kind of audiences 
for whom the Functional Claim might have appeal. On the basis of the considerations adduced 
above, we might expect the Functional Claim to have appeal for at least some theists, some 
naturalists attracted to a naturalistic spiritual life, and, of course, those who are antecedently 
attracted to pantheism. To a lesser extent, it may prove attractive to naturalists not antecedently 
attracted to a spiritual life, who find the evidence adduced in favor of the claim persuasive. 
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Move then to the Objectual Claim²that the most fitting object of awe is the cosmos. The 
primary route to affirming this claim is to proceed by identifying the qualities exhibited by 
objects for which our awe most survives critical scrutiny, and then noting that the cosmos 
exhibits these qualities par excellence. Since it does, we can conclude that idealized awe would 
take the cosmos as its most proper object. This style of argument by its nature is always subject 
to further empirical testing. My proposal here is that an argument of this kind can be made that is 
attractive from the standpoint of existing conceptual and empirical research on awe; further 
empirical work could certainly further support it or impugn it. 
Specifically, my proposal is that objects for which awe most survives critical scrutiny 
have the following two features. First, they exhibit complex functioning in the production of a 
valuable end. 7KHHQGQHHGQ¶WEHDQRYHUDOOYDOXDEOHRQH²one whose total good-making 
features outweigh its total bad-making features. But, it must exhibit good-making features, and it 
is in virtue of the good-making features that the object properly elicits awe. I will call this feature 
apparently directed complexity. Second, proper objects of awe are in-principle producible 
objects the production of which outstrips the expHULHQW¶VSURGXFWLYHFDSDFLWLHVThe most fitting 
objects of awe are strictly speaking creatable, though for them to remain objects of awe their 
FUHDWLRQPXVWRXWVWULSWKHH[SHULHQW¶VFXUUHQWSRZHUVRIFUHDWLRQI will call this feature 
beyondness. 
The claim that the most fitting objects of awe exhibit apparently directed complexity and 
beyondness receives considerable confirmation when examined in light of existing conceptual 
and empirical work on awe. Current empirical research strongly confirms the claim that proper 
objects of awe exhibit complex functioning. The dominant contemporary empirical model of awe 
FRQFHLYHVRIDZHDVRQHRIVHYHUDO³HSLVWHPLF´HPRWLRQVWKHIXQFWLRQRIZKLFKLVGHILQHGYLDLWV
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relation to knowledge and understanding (Valdesolo, Shtulman, and Baron 2017). Researchers 
have found that aZHLV³HOLFLWHGE\SHUFHSWXDOO\RUFRQFHSWXDOO\FRPSOH[LQIRUPDWLRQ-rich 
VWLPXOL´ (Shiota, Keltner, and Mossman 2007: 947) and that experiencing awe is correlated with 
the activation of reward- and motivation-related brain areas sensitive to aspects of experience 
carrying significant information (Vartanian and Goel 2004). Experiencing awe is correlated with 
the perception of patterns (Valdosolo and Graham 2014DQGWKH³PRWLYDWLRQWRILQGRUGHUDQG
H[SODQDWLRQ´ (Valdesolo, Park, and Gottlieb 2016: 1), whether from a scientific or religious 
source.  
The empirical literature on awe not only provides reason to think that proper awe-
elicitors exhibit complexity, but it provides reason to think that they exhibit this complexity in 
the production of a valuable end. First, the fact that experiences of awe often engender a search 
for specifically agentic explanations (Valdesolo and Graham 2014) corroborates the proposal 
that ideal awe-elicitors will exhibit complex functioning toward a valuable end, given modest 
assumptions about the exercise of agency. Second, while some researchers have wished to 
remain open to the idea that awe experiences can have negative stimuli (e.g. Keltner and Haidt 
2003, Roberts 2003), reported awe-elicitors are in fact overwhelmingly interpreted as positive. 
6KLRWD.HOWQHUDQG0RVVPDQZULWHUHJDUGLQJWKHLUZRUNRQHOLFLWRUVRIDZHWKDW³2QHVWULNLQJ
feature of the awe-eliciting events described by participants is that all were interpreted as 
SRVLWLYH´ (2007: 950). An attractive explanation of why this is so is that awe-elicitors exhibit 
apparently directed complexity of the kind described²complex functioning productive of an end 
that has salient valuable features, even if it is not overall better that the end obtained. In order to 
induce awe, there must be something about the experience that the experient interprets as 
positive. Kristján Kristjánsson appearVWRVKDUHWKLVYLHZ³I doubt that experiences of awe can 
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EHHQWLUHO\QHJDWLYH´ (2017: 133). To appropriate an idea from Keltner and Haidt (2003), I would 
suggest that, rather than concluding that awe-elicitors can be interpreted as entirely negative, 
what instead occurs is that awe experiences can be ³IODYRUHG´E\DFFRPSDQ\LQJH[SHULHQFHV
including the experience of fear. The complexity of some awe-HOLFLWRUVVXFKDV5REHUWV¶V(2003) 
example of an atom bomb, involves the exercise of immense transformative power. Such 
transformative power is itself naturally interpreted as positive, though of course the destruction 
caused by this power is just as naturally interpreted as overall negative and fear-inducing. My 
proposal is that to the extent that such elicitors are proper elicitors of awe, it is because of their 
positive elements. The proposal that proper awe-elicitors exhibit apparently directed complexity 
thus receives considerable confirmation from contemporary conceptual and empirical research. 
 Likewise with the proposal that the most proper awe-elicitors are in-principle producible 
objects the production of which outstrips the productive capacities of the experient. Start with the 
second part of this feature²that the objects of awe outstrip the productive capacities of the 
experient. This idea is widely endorsed, though language referencing productive capacities is not 
always used. It is very common for accounts of awe to reference some way in which the awe-
elicitor is perceived to be beyond the experient. For example, .ULVWMiQVVRQZULWHVWKDW³7KH
object of awe is captured by the cognition that the subject is experiencing or has experienced an 
instantiation of a truly great ideal that is mystifying or even ineffable in transcending ordinary 
human H[SHULHQFHV´ (2017: 132). The perception of the awe-elicitor as in some sense beyond the 
experient can help explain why it is common for experients of awe to report that their experience 
made them feel small or insignificant (Shiota, Keltner, and Mossman 2007: 953).  
 When pressed for further details regarding in what precise way the proper awe-elicitor is 
beyond the subject, scholars have produced a variety of answers none of which is particularly 
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compelling. Kristjánsson, as we saw above, appeals to the idea that the elicitor is beyond 
ordinary human experience. But this conflicts with the idea, voiced by others, that humans can 
and should be in awe of many ordinary experiences (cf. Wettstein 2012). These experiences 
might include childbirth, for example²something that has been used as a prime example in the 
empirical study of awe (e.g., Van Cappellen and Saroglou 2012). In the empirical literature, the 
standard account of that in virtue of which the awe-elicitor is beyond the subject is that it is not 
understood by him²it does not conform to his existing paradigms for making sense of the 
world. 9DOGHVROR6KWXOPDQDQG%DURQZULWH³$ZHLVWULJJHUHGE\DQXQH[SHFWHGHYHQWOLNH
surprise, and involves the salience of a gap in knowledge and a desire to acquire more 
information, like curiosity and wonder, but it also entails an inability to assimilate information 
LQWRH[LVWLQJPHQWDOVWUXFWXUHVDQGDUHVXOWLQJQHHGIRUDFFRPPRGDWLRQ´ (2017: 3). But this 
proposal suffers from two serious problems. First, as Krisjánsson (2017) points out, it is perfectly 
legitimate²even common²for people to continue experiencing awe for a phenomenon after 
appropriately accommodating for phenomena of that type. In these cases, the awe-elicitors 
QHHGQ¶WEHEH\RQGWKHLUH[SHULHQWVLQWHUPVRIWKHH[SHULHQWV¶XQGHUVWDQGLQJRUODFNRI
accommodation for them. Second, if the function of awe were to motivate accommodation in the 
way voiced in the quotation from Valdesolo and colleagues, then it would not make sense for 
experients of awe to report that they characteristically desire for the awe experience to continue. 
Instead, they would report wishing for it to end²wishing, in particular, for their perceived need 
for accommodation (part of what it is to be in awe, on this view) to end. But wishing for the awe 
experience to continue is precisely what awe experients consistently report (Shiota, Keltner, and 
Mossman 2007: 953). 
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 So the sense in which proper awe-elicitors are beyond their experients is neither in virtue 
RIEHLQJRXWVLGHWKHUHDOPRIRUGLQDU\KXPDQH[SHULHQFHQRULQEHLQJEH\RQGWKHH[SHULHQW¶V
understanding. An attractive alternative is the one identified above: the sense in which objects of 
awe remain beyond a subject, even if understood by the subject and even if part of ordinary 
KXPDQH[SHULHQFHLVWKDWWKH\DUHEH\RQGWKHVXEMHFW¶VSURGXFWLYHFDSDFLWLHV7KHVXEMHFWPLJKW
DSSURSULDWHO\WKLQNRIWKHP³,ZRXOGQever have thought to make things that way, even if I had 
WKHDELOLW\DQGRSSRUWXQLW\´ One interesting feature of this proposal is that it generates 
empirically testable predictions²for example, that elicitors of awe will cease eliciting awe if 
they become producible by the experient. For example, an artist in training once awed by his 
WHDFKHU¶VFUHDWLRQVZLOOQRORQJHUEHDZHGE\WKHPZKHQKHDWWDLQVWKHVNLOOWRUHOLDEO\SURGXFH
such himself. He might remain in  awe that human beings have evolved to have such capacities 
in the first place²but here his awe takes a different object from the creations themselves. 
 Before turning to the first part of the beyondness feature, it is worth remarking that the 
defense thus far offered is compatible with a certain evolutionary story about the primordial 
function of awe UHFDOO.HOWQHU¶VDQG+DLGW¶VDOWHUQDWLYHVWRU\DERXWWKHSULPRUGLDOIXQFWLRQRI
awe discussed above). According to this story, the primordial function of awe was to reward with 
positive affect experiHQFHVRISURGXFLEOHREMHFWVWKDWRXWVWULSSHGWKHH[SHULHQW¶VFXUUHQW
productive capacities. These experiences would have much the effect highlighted in the 
contemporary psychological literature with respect to generating learning. They would render 
early hominids more open toward encountering new, complex objects that could aid in their 
survival. Such a stance could help explain the prevalence of tool-use in hominids when 
contrasted with other primates (cf. De Cruz and De Smedt 2014: 67). Given the Functional 
Claim of the Awe-some Argument for Pantheism, this epistemic function is not the only function 
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of awe²at least not in its contemporary expressions. But, it may nonetheless have been an 
important function of the emotion, and it may continue to be. It may have been that early on awe 
attached to more easily producible objects than it does now, but as human capacities for 
production advanced the remit of awe also advanced, until awe as we now know it can be 
directed toward any in-principle producible object, including the cosmos. 
 This last remark leads us finally to the first part of the beyondness feature²that proper 
objects of awe are in-SULQFLSOHSURGXFLEOH$VMXVWVXJJHVWHGVRPHRIDZH¶VREMHFWVDUHLQIDFW
producible and even produced by other human beings (as in the case of works of art or 
sophisticated tools2WKHUVRIDZH¶VREMHFWVDUHQRWW\SLFDOO\SURGXFHGE\KXPDQEHLQJVEXW
could be produced through concerted effort. This could even be true of incredible landscapes. In 
the limiting cases, proper objects of awe may only be producible by a superior intelligence rather 
than by human beings. This may be the case with the cosmos as a whole. 
 The hypothesis that proper objects of awe are in-principle producible fits well with data 
regarding elicitors of awe. The significant majority of reported awe-elicitors are either human 
works of art or accomplishment or natural phenomena (Shiota, Keltner, and Mossman 2007)²
each of which coheres with the present feature. On the other hand, some authors give the 
impression that other persons, including divine persons, are proper objects of awe. Thus, for 
H[DPSOH5REHUW5REHUWVZULWHV³<RXFDQSURSHUO\EHLQDZHEHIRUH*RG´ (2003: 269), having 
in mind a God of the traditional theistic sort (cf. also Wettstein 2012). Given that such a God is 
supposed to not be in-principle producible, this may seem to furnish a counterexample to the 
proposed feature of awe. But, I doubt the counterexample has much force. Among potential 
objects of awe, other persons²even divine persons²occupy a precarious position. Kristjánsson 
ZULWHV³5HYHUHQFHIRUDSHUVRQKXPDQRUGLYLQHLVVRPHWLPHVGHVFULEHGDVµDZH¶EXW,ILQG
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WKDWDQLQIHOLFLWRXVH[WHQVLRQ´ (2017: 132, n.2). Indeed, when people report awe that is directed 
toward another pHUVRQWKH\WHQGHLWKHUWRIRFXVRQWKHRWKHU¶VDFFRPSOLVKPHQWRURQVRPHNLQG
of significant transition that person (and others) went through (see again Shiota, Keltner, and 
Mossman 2007). The focus tends to be then either on something the other person does or on 
some process in which the other is involved²each of which is producible. The same can be 
applied to awe of a God of the traditional theistic sort. When awe is properly directed toward 
VXFKD*RGLWLVGLUHFWHGWRZDUGWKLV*RG¶VZRUNUDWKHUWKDQtoward this God simpliciter. Recall 
the earlier quotation from Peterson and Seligman, now with some added italics³DZHLVWKH
proper response to seeing any manifestation RI*RG*RG¶VSRZHURU*RG¶VJRRGQHVVUHYHDOHG
in any aspect of creation, be it a lDQGVFDSHDWKXQGHUVWRUPDFDWKHGUDORUDYLUWXRXVSHUVRQ´
When we most properly stand in awe before a theistic God, we do so by experiencing awe for 
WKLV*RG¶VSURGXFWLYHHIIRUWV 
 There is considerable support, then, for the idea that proper objects of awe are in-
SULQFLSOHSURGXFLEOHREMHFWVWKDWDUHEH\RQGWKHH[SHULHQW¶VSURGXFWLYHSRZHUVDQGWKDWH[KLELW
complex functioning in the production of a valuable end. What remains is to show that the 
cosmos exemplifies these features par excellence; it is the most comprehensive entity that 
exhibits both apparently directed complexity and beyondness, and as such is the object for which 
awe will most survive critical scrutiny in idealized conditions. Establishing this claim, I take it, is 
somewhat less difficult than establishing the preceding claims about the nature of awe. After all, 
it is precisely this way of thinking about the cosmos that motivates the contemporary fine-tuning 
argument. According to this argument, if the fundamental constants and laws of the universe had 
been only slightly different, the universe would not have been life-permitting (Manson 2009). 
The universe as a whole then involves a vastly complex process governed by certain defining 
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parameters that enable the whole to exhibit the positive feature of permitting goods of life. 
Whether or not we agree ultimately with the conclusion of the fine-tuning argument that this 
apparently directed complexity indeed calls for the direction of an intelligent designer, the 
premise alone²which tends to be accepted by both sides in the debate²is enough to confirm 
what is at issue in completing the present argument for the Objectual Claim of the Awe-some 
Argument for Pantheism. The universe as we know it most thoroughly exemplifies those features 
toward which proper awe is sensitive; it is in-principle producible, vastly beyond the productive 
powers of experients of awe, and involves incredibly complex functioning in the production of a 
valuable end. 
 I doubt there are very serious limitations regarding the sort of audiences likely to find my 
contentions in defense of the Objectual Claim attractive. Thus, the Awe-some Argument for 
Pantheism as a whole should be appealing to the audiences already identified in discussion of the 
Functional claim: namely, many already attracted to pantheism, some theists, some naturalists 
inclined toward a spiritual life, and perhaps even some naturalists not so inclined.  
 
2. Responding to Objections to Pantheism 
The Awe-some Argument for Pantheism offers more than just an isolated argument for 
pantheism. It offers a route to pantheism that provides pantheists with distinctive resources for 
defending their position against objections. In this section, I will briefly address how taking the 
route to pantheism provided by the Awe-some Argument for Pantheism allows the pantheist to 
deftly handle three persistent objections to pantheism: the problem of personality, the problem of 
unity, and the problem of evil. 
 The problem of personality maintains that pantheistic conceptions of the divine are 
inadequate for theological discourse because they are committed to an impersonal divinity. 
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Being divine, according to this objection, requires being personal. Nothing impersonal, such as 
the cosmos, could be divine. The objection is often wielded against pantheism by traditional 
theists³traditional theism has regularly opposed pantheism on the grounds that it tends to be 
LPSHUVRQDO´ZULWHV:LOOLDP0DQGHU Sometimes the objection is generated by appealing 
to properties the divine must have beyond the property of personhood²such as worship-
worthiness (Leftow 6016)²where these properties themselves entail that the divine must be 
personal. 
 Of course, not all pantheists will be worried by this sort of objection. In particular, some 
pantheists do attribute personality to the cosmos, and even worship-worthiness (e.g., Forrest 
2016). An advocate of the Awe-some Argument for Pantheism is as welcome to pursue these 
alternatives as other pantheists. But the point I wish to make here is that the Awe-some 
Argument for Pantheism makes more viable an alternative response that GRHVQ¶Wrequire 
attributing personality to the cosmos. This is because, given this argument, divinity is defined 
ostensively as that which most continues to elicit awe. Whether the divine so defined must be 
personal or worship-worthy is an empirical question, not something to be decided from the 
armchair. When we do the empirical work, as proposed in the previous section, we do not find 
that personality is a good candidate for features of the divine defined in this way. Products of 
SHUVRQVUDWKHUWKDQSHUVRQVWHQGWREHDPRQJDZH¶VPRVWSURSHUREMHFWV 
 Turn then to the problem of unity. This persistent objection to pantheism maintains that 
the cosmos is not sufficiently unified or singular to be divine. It is a diversity of many things, not 
DVLQJOHWKLQJ,WLVQ¶WHYHQproperly DQ³LW´0LFKDHO/HYLQHFKFODLPVWKDWE\
definition, pantheism involves the view that all that there is forms a unity, and he maintains that 
it is among the central problems of pantheism to explicate just what sort of unity this is. Some 
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pantheists have fulfilled this ambition by endorsing views of the cosmos that are often perceived 
by others as metaphysically extravagant, such as 6SLQR]D¶Vview that the cosmos as a whole is 
the only substance, and that what seem to us to be substances within the cosmos are simply 
modes of the cosmos. Certainly, these ways of specifying pantheism are not unavailable to 
advocates of the Awe-some Argument for Pantheism. But, again the point I wish to stress at 
present is that this Argument makes available for pantheists a way of engaging with the problem 
of unity that does not require specifying pantheism in this way.  
 To see why, return to what was said in the previous Section on behalf of viewing the 
cosmos as the most proper object of awe and hence the most divine. What makes the cosmos the 
most proper object of awe is that it exhibits apparently directed complexity and beyondness par 
excellence. It is primarily the feature of apparently directed complexity that accounts for in what 
way the cosmos is unified on this account. It is unified by having laws and constants that govern 
the functioning of all of its components, and do so in such a way as to make the whole life-
permitting. The sort of unity required for the cosmos to be divine is just this sort of unity, and 
QHHGQ¶WEHPRUHJLYHQWKH$ZH-some Argument for Pantheism. Since this sort of unity is often 
ascribed to the universe independently of any kind of pantheistic or other spiritual commitment, 
it is a sort of unity that is likely to be viewed less objectionably by critics of pantheism. Notably, 
it has been a unity of much this kind has in fact been the predominant view of pantheists 
historically (Levine 1994: 40). The Awe-some Argument for Pantheism in this way offers the 
pantheist a ZD\RIH[SOLFDWLQJKHUQRWLRQRIGLYLQLW\ZKHUHLWGRHVQ¶WUHTXLUHDQDFFRXQWRIWKH
unity of the cosmos that is likely to be viewed suspiciously by her critics. 
 Turn finally to the problem of evil. The problem of evil for pantheists amounts to the 
difficulty of explaining how it could be that there is evil at all in the cosmos, if the cosmos is 
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itself GLYLQH$V0DQGHUSXWVLW³it is challenged that if God includes everything and God is 
perfect or good, then everything which exists ought to be perfect or good; a conclusion which 
seems wholly counter to our common experience that much in the world is very far from being 
so´ (2016). Mander points out that one route pantheists have taken in response to this difficulty 
is to argue that apparent evils are merely apparent. Sub specia aeternitatis all there is in the 
cosmos is indeed good, and the objection is answered. Again, my contention here is that the 
Awe-some Argument for Pantheism offers another way out.  
 As with the problem of personality, the problem of evil for pantheism relies upon a 
FRQFHSWLRQRI*RGWKDWQHHGQ¶WEHDFFHSWHGE\WKHSDQWKHLVWZKRUHDFKHVSDQWKHLVPYLDWKH$ZH-
some Argument for Pantheism. It relies upon a conception of God as perfect or good. But, 
whether God is perfect or good, given the Awe-some Argument for Pantheism, is something that 
must await empirical investigation of the objects of awe. When we investigate proper objects of 
awe, we do not find that they are perfect. So, the version of the problem of evil for pantheism 
based oQWKLVFODLPDERXWWKHGLYLQHQHHGQ¶WPRYHWUDYHOHUVRQWKLVURXWHWRSDQWKHLVP:Hdo 
learn something about the goodness of the divine via attending to proper objects of awe, 
however. We learn that proper objects of awe exhibit complex functioning in the promotion of a 
good end. So, there must be something good about the cosmos if it is to be divine. Yet, the 
demand of goodness required is still much less than is needed to make the problem of evil for 
pantheists very worrisome. For, as we saw above, proper objects of awe can certainly have 
negative features. They may not even need to be all-things-considered valuable. Thus, the mere 
existence of evils within the cosmos is no threat to pantheism reached via this route. 
 There may be other versions of the problem of evil that still have some force against this 
version of pantheism. In particular, we might ask whether the evils of the cosmos (or comparable 
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evils) are required in order for the cosmos to exhibit the complex functioning it does in the 
production of the valuable ends it does²if, in particular, the evils of the cosmos are required for 
the cosmos to sustain goods of living beings. The question is worth asking since it may be that if 
the cosmos does not require the sorts of evils that exist in it in order to exhibit the features of 
properly awesome objects, then what is really most properly awesome is not the cosmos itself, 
but the cosmos minus these features. I say that this may be so, because whether it is so is to be 
determined empirically by whether our awe is in fact sensitive to these nuances. I leave it as an 
open question here whether this is how idealized awe operates. 
 If this is indeed how idealized awe operates, then there is a version of the problem of evil 
for pantheism of the kind advocated in this paper that retains some force. But there are two 
reasons to think that the force it possesses is not all that forceful. First, for pantheists of the kind 
in view here, evils of the kind that occur in the cosmos must at most be necessary for the cosmos 
to exhibit complex functioning in the production of a good end. By contrast, it is typically 
maintained that traditional theists must claim that the evils of the cosmos are required for the 
cosmos to exhibit outweighingly valuable goods²goods that outweigh in value the evils in 
question. Thus, the version of the problem of evil that perhaps retains force against pantheists of 
the sort in view here is a less demanding version of the problem than that which has force against 
traditional theists. Second, suppose that it turned out that evils of the sort that occur in the 
cosmos are not required for the cosmos to exhibit the complex functioning it does in producing 
life-SHUPLWWLQJJRRGV7KLVVKRXOGQ¶WOHDGWRDFRPSOHWHDEDQGRQPHQWRISDQWKHLVPEXWWRD
refinement of it. Those attracted to the Awe-VRPH$UJXPHQWIRU3DQWKHLVPVKRXOGQ¶WFODLPWKDW
there is no most divine thing; they should just claim that the most divine thing is not the cosmos 
as a whole, but the cosmos as a whole with some holes²holes at the sites of the relevant evils. 
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Pantheism with holes²albeit at different sites²has in fact been defended by others, notably 
Peter Forrest (2007). So such a view is not without precedent. 
 Historically, the problems of personality, unity, and evil have exercised considerable 
force against pantheists. While there are various ways pantheists can respond to these problems, 
the Awe-some Argument for Pantheism offers distinctive resources which pantheists can employ 
to eliminate them or reduce their force, and this is an additional reason for the argument to be 
given a hearing. 
 
3. Questions for Further Exploration 
I conclude this paper by exploring three critical questions about the Awe-some Argument for 
Pantheism that help illustrate various ways in which the basic view sketched here can be 
developed in different, more detailed directions. These include more exotic versions of 
pantheism as well as views that resist easy categorization as pantheistic or not pantheistic. 
The first question is, What if the cosmos is a multiverse? Throughout this paper, I have 
used the term cosmos without defining it. In using the term, I have primarily been conceiving of 
the cosmos as the universe²our universe. But it has become increasingly popular to think of the 
cosmos as not just a single universe, but a multiverse²a plurality of universes (see Kraay 2014). 
There are various competing conceptions of what such a multiverse would be like. And some 
authors have defended pantheistic or panentheistic views of one or another kind of multiverse 
(e.g., Nagasawa 2014). ,¶OOEULHIO\FRQVLGHUKHUHZKDWLPSOLFDWLRQVWKHUHZRXOGEHIRUWKH$ZH-
some Argument for Pantheism if the cosmos is one or another kind of multiverse. 
 Two important questions for our purposes regarding multiverse theories are the 
following. First, in what way, if at all, are the universes within the multiverse connected? 
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Second, to what extent do the other universes within the multiverse resemble our own universe, 
specifically with respect to having constants and laws that enable them to sustain life?  
 It is common for advocates of multiverse theories to claim that universes within the 
multiverse are spatiotemporally isolated, and indeed causally isolated (e.g., Turner 2003, Kraay 
2010). There is no interaction between them, and if they are without a creator they share no 
common causes or effects. If this is how we conceive of the multiverse, then I think it is less 
likely that the Awe-some Argument for Pantheism will enable us to reach a pantheistic 
conclusion regarding the multiverse. The reason is that, if the universes within the multiverse are 
isolated in this way, then it is difficult to see how the whole could exhibit the sort of complex 
functioning that is a hallmark of awe-elicitors. Our own universe exhibits the requisite complex 
functioning via the causal interactions of its components, and it is difficult to imagine that 
complex functioning in the production of a valuable end can be achieved without this. 
 Other multiverse theories permit interaction between the universes within the multiverse. 
Some theories allow, for example, for universes to generate further universes²even in such a 
way as to pass down heritable traits (cf. Smolin 1997, Draper 2004). Other theories appeal to a 
creator of the multiverse, who unites all of the universes within the multiverse at least by 
creating each one HJ2¶&RQQRU, Kraay 2010, Turner 2003). These theories are more 
likely to allow larger parts of the multiverse, if not the whole, to be divine, given the Awe-some 
Argument for Pantheism. For, much as processes of biological evolution can properly give rise to 
awe, processes of universe evolution could; and much as an ordered natural landscape can 
properly give rise to awe, an ordering of universes could. So, whether the Awe-some Argument 
for Pantheism retains its persuasive force on the assumption that the cosmos is a multiverse 
21 
 
depends in part on what kind of multiverse we have, and in particular on whether the universes 
within the multiverse are causally isolated. 
  The implications of the Awe-some Argument for Pantheism are also influenced by the 
intrinsic characteristics of the universes within the multiverse. On some multiverse theories, very 
many²even infinitely many²possible universes exist, with vastly different constants and laws, 
with only very few universes able to sustain life (e.g., Smolin 1997). On other theories, only 
universes with intrinsic features making them relevantly similar to our own in value exist (e.g., 
Kraay 2010). These intrinsic features of universes within the multiverse will have implications 
for the extent to which individual universes are proper objects of awe, regardless of whether the 
multiverse as a whole is. It could be, for instance, that the multiverse as a whole is not a proper 
object of awe, but that many or all universes within it are, leading to a kind of polytheistic 
pantheism (cf. Forrest 2016, Leslie 2014). 
 Move to a second question. Several times now I have mentioned the possibility of a 
creator of the divine cosmos, whether that cosmos is a single universe or a multiverse. It is time 
to face head-on the question: What if there is a creator of the cosmos? It might seem that a 
pantheist motivated by the Awe-some Argument for Pantheism is put in an awkward position if 
there is such a creator. For, such a pantheist would presumably maintain that the cosmos is the 
most divine thing, and yet this most divine thing has a creator. To complicate matters slightly, 
we might even imagine that the creator is the sort of God envisioned in the Abrahamic faiths, a 
God viewed by many as a proper object of worship. On such a view, pantheism is hardly a robust 
alternative to traditional theism; it is some kind of variant of it. 
 My response to these observations is to bite the bullet, so to speak, insofar as there is any 
bullet to bite. It is true that pantheism is sometimes presented as an alternative to traditional 
22 
 
theism (e.g., Levine 1994). But, it is also common for pantheism of some form to be combined 
with traditional theistic commitments. For example, Peter Forrest combines a pantheistic 
FRQFHSWLRQRIWKHXQLYHUVHDV*RG¶VERG\ZLWKWUDGLWLRQDOWKHLVP+HZULWHV³7KHURPDQWLF
nature religion of poets (Wordsworth, or in a more Christian way Gerard Manley Hopkins) is 
quite compatible . . . with the Abrahamic tradition. The divine narrative identity can give such 
QDWXUHZRUVKLSHPRWLRQDOO\HQJDJLQJGHWDLO´ (2016: 35). :KLOH,KDYHQ¶WDGGUHVVHGZRUVKLS of 
the cosmos in this paper, the Awe-some Argument for Pantheism does provide a similar way to 
combine traditional theistic commitments with at least a divinization of the cosmos.  
 True enough, this combination of views does raise a perplexing question²namely, how 
could it be that the cosmos, rather than the perfect being who creates the cosmos, is most divine? 
But this question seems to me a fecund opportunity for reflection and ingenuity, rather than an 
stunting obstacle to theoretical exploration. One way of approaching the question, for example, is 
WRYLHZWKHFUHDWRU¶VFUHDWLRQVDVH[SUHVVLRQVHYHQHIIXVLRQVRIWKHFUHDWRU7KH\DUHWKHRQO\
way whereby that creator is ever encountered. There is, on such a view, nothing else to encounter 
that is any more divine than the cosmos. It is in this sense that the cosmos is most fully divine. 
We may properly view it as an intriguing feature to the Awe-some Argument for Pantheism that 
it is a route to pantheism that invites WKRXJKGRHVQ¶WGHPDQG speculation of this sort. 
 The final question I will address overlaps with the previous. The question is: What if the 
most proper object of awe is more than the cosmos? The question perhaps arises most naturally 
when we observe that many of the proper objects of awe are processes that involve the exercise 
of agency. For example, when I am awed by a magnificent artistic performance, I am awed not 
only by the physical movements of the artist and their effects, but by the exercises of creative 
intellect deployed in this endeavor. This total complex, including the exercises of creative 
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intellect, is a fitting object of awe: it is an in-principle producible object that outstrips my own 
productive capacities, and the whole exhibits complex functioning in the production of a 
valuable end. Suppose now that we shift attention to awe for the cosmos, and that we are tempted 
to view the cosmos as the result of a process exhibiting similar agency²perhaps the agency of 
the sort of God identified in the Abrahamic faiths. If awe in the two cases is to be parallel, then it 
is tempting to think that the proper object of awe in this latter case will be more than the cosmos 
as this is naturally understood. It will include the exhibitions of creative intellect undertaken by 
the Abrahamic God in the production of the cosmos, as well as the cosmos itself. These 
exhibitions of intellect are themselves in-principle producible, but it is certainly unnatural to 
think of them as elements of the cosmos itself. In this case, the kind of view generated by the 
Awe-some Argument for Pantheism is perhaps ultimately best classified as panentheistic. On this 
view, the cosmos is a part of the most divine thing, which also includes exhibitions of agency on 
the part of the Abrahamic God²though not the Abrahamic God itself. 
 This Section has explored three questions which highlight ways in which the Awe-some 
Argument for Pantheism can be further developed to yield more exotic versions of pantheism or 
even views that resist easy classification as pantheistic or not pantheistic. We have seen, in 
particular, that the Awe-some Argument may provide a route to multiverse pantheism, 
polytheistic pantheism, pantheism that incorporates elements of traditional theism, and even 
panentheism. In this way, the Awe-some Argument proves not only to have potential as a novel 
motivator of traditional pantheism, but to motivate exploration of a variety of unusual and 
intriguing approaches to the divine.  
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